Current discussions on consumer redress: collective redress and ADR by Christopher Hodges
ERA Forum (2012) 13:11–33
DOI 10.1007/s12027-011-0245-5
A RT I C L E
Current discussions on consumer redress: collective
redress and ADR
Christopher Hodges
Published online: 11 January 2012
© The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The two topics of collective redress and ADR might, at first sight, appear
to have little in common. One is usually thought to relate to a court, judicial proce-
dure and the other to a non-judicial procedure. The first essentially involves coercion
and the second its opposite, voluntary agreement. But in fact these two subjects have
become closely related, both in practice and politically. This paper will start by sum-
marising the historical development of each procedure, and the debate that surrounds
each, showing how the two streams have become merged.
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1 Collective redress
Two facts are widely known. Firstly, mass problems can occur. There can be argu-
ments over whether bank charges are too high; whether terms and conditions are
unfair commercial practice; whether a medicine has caused injuries; whether govern-
ment actions are illegal. Such issues can affect many people. The interests of economy
suggest that similar issues should be dealt with together, so as to achieve coherent,
consistent and economical results.
Secondly, the mass technique that is most well known, is the American class ac-
tion, which has been extensively used in the United States of America since the 1960s.
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Various governments around the world have introduced rules on mass judicial pro-
cedures that are broadly based on the US class action model. Yet many European
governments have been notably tentative about introducing a class action. This may
have occurred politically as a result of pressure from business, but the underlying
concern is about what Europeans perceive to be the ‘abuse’ that is associated with the
US class action.1
But the debate in Europe has moved in directions that may surprise many ob-
servers. Essentially, if we ask what we are trying to achieve, and then ask what op-
tions exist for achieving the real goals, we end up with a different approach. This
involves putting to one side the assumption that the courts offer the only technique
that can deliver redress. It involves looking afresh at all available options. That is
where ADR comes in, in a new matrix of techniques. A judicial class action on its
own may be seen as an old fashioned technique.
1.1 Distinguishing the goals and architecture of legal systems
One very important point has to be understood about the role that class actions play in
different legal systems—because the same technique plays different roles in different
systems, and realising this fact has huge implications for making a selection between
the available techniques.
In general, the architecture of the entire legal system in the USA, almost uniquely
around the world, strongly emphasizes private enforcement [of both private rights and
public norms],2 and Americans distrust enforcement by public authorities, especially
federal agencies, which they regard as being captured by the Executive.3
On the other hand, European legal systems adopt both public enforcement and
private enforcement, often separating them for public norms and private rights re-
spectively. European courts do sometimes need to manage the processing of multiple
claims—but far less frequently than occurs in America, since class actions are used
more frequently there as regulatory enforcement mechanisms, on an opt-out model.
That is why:
• Continental civil law jurisdictions do not have discovery: instead, their substantive
law aligns the definition of rights and breaches so as not to require evidence in
most situations.
• The loser pays rule is almost universal.4 Contingency fees (percentages of damages
or recovery) are banned in almost every European jurisdiction, although success
fees are widely permitted.
• ‘Class actions’ for damages are very new in about half of the Member States, and
they are not widely used even where they exist.
1Many leading politicians have referred to ‘abuse’ produced by US class actions, see below: recently see
Commissioner Almunia in the hearing on collective redress for competition damages at the Economic and
Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels on 22 September 2011.
2An influential analysis was Kalven, Rosenfield [21], 684–687.
3See Hodges [12].
4Hodges, Vogenauer, Tulibacka [16].
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Further, the prevailing theory of enforcement in USA is based solely on deterrence:
imposing high costs on business, ex post, to deter future conduct. In contrast, Most
European agencies (apart from DG COMP) adopt an enforcement policy that is not
solely based on deterrence, such as responsive regulation, risk-based enforcement,
and others. It has been argued that, a deterrence theory alone is less effective and
more expensive than other enforcement policies.5 For one thing, reliance solely on an
ex post deterrence theory requires imposition of huge penalties, to take into account
the ex post effect and the probability of detection: since ex ante control is not relied
on.
If you want to encourage the use of a private action technique, you would:
a. Remove or reducing barriers to a claimant
b. Place incentives for claimants and intermediaries (lawyers) to investigate possible
wrongdoing and institute litigation.
These barriers and incentives are principally economic. There are several familiar
levers:
a. No cost to the claimant (intermediary supplies funding);
b. No loser pays rule;
c. In some circumstances, a one-way cost shifting rule: claimant does not pay if loses,
defendant pays if loses;6
d. High damages, so as to facilitate funding by the claimant’s intermediary, and pro-
vide deterrence on defendants (see below);
e. High contingency or court-approved fees for lawyers;
f. Wide rules on discovery and depositions;
g. Punitive damages, or triple damages in antitrust;
h. Jury trials;
i. Coordination of individual claims: Class actions or Multi-District Litigation rules.
Introducing each one of the above levers would facilitate increased levels of litigation,
and banning each one would discourage it. There are no other magic safeguards—
you just have to play with these levers, depending on whether you want more or less
litigation. Most of these levers are within the competence of Member States, not of
the EU.
Many people think that all of these levers do not exist in Europe. That is wrong.
There are clear trends in several Member States, for example, towards cutting legal
aid and replacing it with success fees, introducing contingency fees (in UK),7 low
‘cost shifting’ or one-way cost shifting,8 and financing litigation by third party fun-
ders,9 several of whom already finance collective claims.
5Hodges [6], 261.
6Farhang [4].
7Reforming Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales—Implementation of Lord Justice
Jackson’s Recommendations. The Government Response (Ministry of Justice, 2011).
8Ibid.
9See Report by Hodges, Peysner, Nurse [18].
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Within the technical rules of a collective court procedure, there are also other
levers, such as:
a. prioritization of pathways: the collective judicial procedure should not be used if
other preferable options exist;
b. restriction on use of the procedure to approved personnel;
c. evaluation of the merits;
d. certification by the court;
e. opt-out or opt-in;
f. notice provisions requiring notice to be given to all class members of the existence
of an action and/or of a settlement, so they can opt-in or opt-out;
g. court approval of a settlement;
h. court approval of lawyers’ fees;
i. stand-alone or follow-on model.
However, none of these levers can be calibrated, either individually or cumula-
tively. You cannot design a system to give ‘just enough’ safeguards and no more. You
will end up with either too little or too much enforcement (under-restitution or over-
deterrence), and this will vary between types of claim and sectors. If you pull more
levers, you will get more—or less—litigation. That is what is happening now, often
unplanned and uncontrolled, in some Member States.
In these respects, there is no difference between enforcement of competition law,
consumer law, or any other area of law. The procedural levers and their economic
effect are exactly the same, but their magnitude will vary from sector to sector.
1.2 Major events
The following is a summary of the major events in the history of collective redress in
Europe.10 Firstly, let us look at Member State level. Fourteen of the 27 Member States
have judicial collective redress mechanisms in which damages can be claimed,11 but
they have been found to be very different and to have diverse results.12 The studies
and consultations showed that
the vast majority of the existing collective redress mechanisms tend to have
some elements that work, and some that do not. Almost all existing collective
redress mechanisms have some added value compared to individual judicial
redress and alternative dispute resolution schemes. But their efficiency and ef-
fectiveness could be improved. The mechanisms have been applied in relatively
few cases.13
Many of the national models have deliberately been designed conservatively, to avoid
introducing large economic incentives for lawyers that might result in unmerited lit-
igation and abusive practices. The Swedish Class Actions Law, which was based on
10Hodges [8], 96–123; Hodges [14], Hodges [9], 41–66.
11See national reports of the Stanford-Oxford Global Network on Class Actions at globalclassactions.
stanford.edu.
12See Hodges [14]; Hodges [9] and Cafaggi, Micklitz [3].
13Consumer Green Paper, supra note 15, at para. 12.
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the US model, was enacted without the inclusion of contingency fees and no loser
pays rule, as originally proposed. A recent example is the Polish Class Action Law,
which included various safeguard features, such as maintaining the loser pays rule,
the ability for a defendant to request an order that the representative claimant post
a deposit against the costs, the requirement that all claimants must claim the same
amount in damages, the exclusion of non-pecuniary tortious claims, and a limit of
20% on contingency fees.
The European Commission has proceeded carefully, and run into political diffi-
culties. A 2008 consultation on benchmarks14 was followed by a Green Paper on
consumer collective redress,15 which made no statement on the outcome of the con-
sultation on benchmarks, or on any further or revised proposed benchmarks, but was
accompanied by a Questions and Answers document16 and two studies by external
contractors: a Problem Study,17 which evaluated the problems faced by consumers in
obtaining redress, and the economic consequences; and an Evaluation Study,18 which
evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of existing collective redress mechanisms
in the EU.
The Commission concluded in 2008:
Studies . . . have shown that there is no easy answer to the problem. All the cur-
rent redress systems have their strengths and weaknesses and no single mecha-
nism is ideal for all types of claims.19
By 2008, the terminology had changed twice. The first change was from ‘class ac-
tions’ to a European term ‘collective actions’. This signified a political desire to dis-
tance whatever technique might be proposed in Brussels from the ‘US class action’,
which had become a ‘toxic term’. Far more significantly, the second change was from
‘collective actions’ to ‘collective redress’. This signified a growing re-examination of
the essential underlying policy goals, going back to first principles, and re-examining
all available technical options. It was realised that the assumption that a judicial pro-
cedure was the only option was not only untrue, and that other options existed, but
also that it was the wrong place to start.
By 2008, the debate on collective redress had crystallised in two different eco-
nomic sectors: consumer redress and competition damages. These are different areas,
14See online: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#Benchmarks. The
benchmarks have been criticized as assuming that the solution would be a judicial solution, and the Com-
mission has privately accepted that view. Hodges [15].
15Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008) 794, 27.11.2008, online: http://ec.europa.eu/
consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.
16MEMO/08/741, 27.11.08.
17Study regarding the problems faced by consumers in obtaining redress for infringements of consumer
protection legislation, and the economic consequences of such problems, by Civic Consulting and Oxford
Economics, 2008, online: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-
final2008-11-26.pdf.
18Study on the Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of Collective Redress mechanisms in the




in which different existing architectures exist for enforcement and redress. But the
two areas became intertwined in the political debate. The consumer redress area had
a long history, stretching back to the 1960s, in which consumer interests had long
called for a class action to be introduced so as to address mass consumer problems.
Debate on the competition side has been about how to deliver damages after breach
of competition law. The right to damages was recognised in EU law only in 2001.20
It appeared that damages were not widely being paid,21 mainly because of a series of
difficulties over bringing claims, such as:
• access to documents to establish liability and quantum, especially those held by
the authorities in their enforcement activities. There was concern that the ‘leniency
programme’ would be undermined if leniency documents were made available to
claimants;
• overcoming the considerable complexities of quantifying losses in competition
cases, including the extent to which a ‘passing on’ defence should be available;
• how to deal with multiple similar cases.
These issues were canvassed in a 2005 Green Paper22 and a 2008 White Paper.23
A central proposal was to introduce two collective procedures, one a representative
action and one a class action, clearly very similar to the American model.
Thus, the question on the competition side is: given that the approach to enforce-
ment has been solely to rely on (ever increasing) fines, and it appears that damages
have frequently not been claimed under the national legal systems, how can damages
be claimed more frequently? The European Commission’s answer to that question
has been to leave the public enforcement policy intact, and to propose to ‘bolt on’ a
separate system of rules to facilitate a privatised approach for claiming damages in
private actions.
These proposals were met with vehement opposition by the German and French
governments, the business community,24 and some academic commentators,25 al-
though widely supported by lawyers, and by many competition economists. In the
20Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297.
21Waelbroeck, Slater, Even-Shoshan [30]. More recent data, notably from Germany, indicates that the level
of claims and/or settlements is higher than thought and appears to be increasing.
22Green Paper: Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2005) 672, 19.12.2005; Com-
mission Staff Working Paper: Annex to the Green Paper ‘Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust
rules’, SEC (2005) 1732, 19.12.2005.
23European Commission (EC), ‘White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’
COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008. Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on damages
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404 (‘Staff Working Paper’). Commission Staff
Working Document accompanying the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust
rules: Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 405 (‘Impact Assessment Report’).
24Letter from the Presidents of the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK),
the Association of German Banks (BdB) and the German Insurance Association (GDV) to President Bar-
roso, 8 May 2009.
25Wils [32] 473–488; Kortmann, Swaak [22]. The latter is a strong attack on DG COMP’s proposals,
arguing that they will lead to ‘overcompensation’ and messing up national rules, especially in relation
to ‘passing on’ of loss and limitation periods. They do not see empirical evidence on which to found a
proposal.
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last days of the Commission in 2009, Competition Commissioner Kroes failed in her
attempt to table a legislative proposal.26
One aspect that is common to the consumer and competition situations is that
mass problems can frequently involve widespread but small losses to many people.
No rational individual would institute an individual court proceeding to recover a
small sum of money, especially where the issues might be complex. It is rational,
therefore, to ask whether mass individual claims can be combined in a procedure
that delivers ‘judicial economy’ and thereby increases access to justice. The US class
action, largely copied in Canadian Provinces and Australia, provides efficiency by
having just a single claimant that represents all other members of the class. In Canada
and Australia, however, there is the problem that the representative claimant bears the
full risk of liability for opponents’ costs under the loser pays rule. This has a chilling
effect on rates of litigation, although the business models and available capital of
some Australian ‘third party’ funders can cover with this financial risk.
When the new Commission was in place in 2009, President Barosso instructed his
Commissioners for Competition and Consumer Affairs, and joined by the Commis-
sioner for Justice, to collaborate in drawing up a unified policy on collective redress.27
A further consultation paper was issued in 2009,28 in which the Commission said:
US style class action is not envisaged. EU legal systems are very different from
the U.S. legal system which is the result of a “toxic cocktail”—a combina-
tion of several elements (punitive damages, contingency fees, opt-out, pre-trial
discovery procedures). . . . This combination of elements—“toxic cocktail”—
should not be introduced in Europe. Different effective safeguards including,
loser pays principles, the judge’s discretion to exclude unmeritorious claims,
and accredited associations which are authorised to take cases on behalf of con-
sumers, are built into existing national collective redress schemes in Europe.
All the Green Paper options, and in particular a possible EU collective pro-
cedure outlined above, reflect EU legal traditions. The Commission seeks to
encourage a competitiveness culture e.g. where businesses which play by the
rules can realise their competitive advantages, not a litigation culture.29
The Commission intends to publish a policy statement on collective redress following
the 2009 consultation paper. This will be published after the Commission has consid-
ered an opinion from the European Parliament, which is expected in late 2011.30
1.3 Some empirical evidence
A threshold issue is to identify what level of need there is for mass redress, and
how much of a problem exists with existing techniques. There is virtually no reliable
26N. Tait, ‘Future of European antitrust proposals in doubt’, Financial Times, 3 October 2009.
27Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps. Joint information note by
Vice-President Viviane Reding, Vice-President Joaquín Almunia and Commissioner John Dalli, 5.10.2010,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2010/EN/2-2010-1192-EN-1-0.Pdf.
28Online: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/consultation_paper2009.pdf.
29European Commission DG SANCO, MEMO/08/741, p. 4.
30The rapporteur is KH Lehne MEP.
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data ion the former question. The 2008 Evaluation Study found that the evidence on
individual economic detriment was low. The average consumer detriment recovered
per litigant was €41 in those states with collective judicial mechanisms, and was
€18 for all consumers in those states without a procedure. Granted that those figures
may not be directly comparable, the difference that introduction of a court-based
collective procedure might be expected to bring was €23 per consumer per annum.
A figure of 10% of collective redress claims having a cross-border element is far from
overwhelming, although the effect depends on the total economic detriment. A total
of 326 cases in 13 jurisdictions over roughly ten years (which is an over-estimate,
since the mechanisms have not existed for that long in some jurisdictions) gives a
rough annual average of 32.5 cases per year. That would equate to 3 or 4 cross-
border cases a year. It is, of course, likely that although individual detriment may be
low (and would result in rational economic behaviour that individual claims would
not be attractive), the combined economic benefit to individual traders of retained
illicit profit from infringements may be high, and the market thus distorted. That
observation prompts the question of whether the problem, and hence the solution,
might be a market regulatory problem rather than a redress problem.
Do collective actions work? Do they deliver mass solutions, quickly, cheaply, and
affect defendants’ behaviour? It may be too soon to evaluate the collective action
rules that have been adopted in the past decade in Member States. But initial results
are not encouraging. Collective actions take too long, and are too expensive. The
experience of product liability cases in England shows that many failed because of
poor merits, and lasted several years.31 The German litigation of Deutsche Telekom
investors under the 2005 Capital Investors Class Action Law (KapMuG) is likely to
continue for 10 years. In contrast, the Dutch approach, based on incentivising parties
to negotiate settlement of their disputes, which are then made binding by the court,
has proved to be attractive and largely efficient.32
1.4 Constitutional issues
Two critical technical issues need to be noted. Firstly, many Continental jurisdictions
have inherent resistance to adopting an opt-out model, since this offends the princi-
ple of individual determination over legal rights, which is contrary to principles of
fundamental rights.33
Secondly, institutional barriers exist to development of an EU enforcement policy,
resting partly on the principle of subsidiarity34 but more on that of procedural auton-
31Hodges [10]. The largest mass litigation in England in the past decade, over injuries allegedly caused by
the MMR vaccine, took 10 years and then collapsed before trial when it was clear that the vaccine was not
the cause of the claimants’ conditions.
322005 Class Action Settlement Law (WCAM).
33See Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights (1951); Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union (2000) at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm.
34Introduced into EU legislation by the Treaty on European Union, art 5.3.: see http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=en&id=74&ftuId=FTU_1.2.2.html.
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omy.35 The latter upholds a constitutional settlement that competence over enforce-
ment of Community rules lies with Member States: the national obligation is merely
to achieve the effect by means that are proportionate, effective and dissuasive. The
proportionality principle has particular importance in the debate on the addition of
fines to damages in relation to competition infringements, without some fundamental
reassessment of their combined effect.
1.5 The new policy for enforcement, redress, and incentivising behaviour
Hodges has suggested a new, integrated policy for enforcement and redress, which
relies on a three pillar model.36 He suggests that the starting point is to define the
basic objectives that society wishes to achieve, which he states as:
1. setting the basic standards of expected behaviour;
2. seeking to prevent things going wrong;
3. putting things right when they go wrong.
It is axiomatic that where there is liability, there must be redress. The issue then
is what techniques can be used. The available techniques, and combinations of tech-
niques, should be evaluated against criteria (especially speed, cost and ability to de-
liver desired outcomes).
In delivering objectives 2 and 3 above, Hodges’ model adopts the following three
pillars:
Pillar 1: enforcement by public authorities, through use of wide-ranging and power-
ful sanctions, with both public and private techniques, subject to democratic
and court controls.
Pillar 3: enforcement by private actors through use of private actions through the
courts.
Pillar 2: direct negotiation and resolution of issues, assisted by independent ADR
pathways.
Use of pillar 2 would be incentivised through the existence of pillars 1 and 3. The
ability of a regulator or a court to impose a solution (individual or mass) would fre-
quently encourage parties to use ADR services. The pillar 1 power may therefore be
rarely used, thereby saving resources. In order to avoid the risk of abusive capture of
a pillar 3 pathway by rent-seeking intermediaries, it would only be available where
a court considers that its use is reasonable, given the availability of a pillar 1 or 2
option.
The OECD recommends that all states should adopt mechanisms that enable con-
sumers to be able to resolve disputes effectively, whether individually, collectively or
35Storskrubb [27], p. 19; Andenas [1], 7–24; van Gerven [29], Prechal [25]; Kakouris [20]. For limi-
tations to this autonomy, through the principles of equivalence and effective protection, see cases: Case
33/75 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR
01989; Case 45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 02043. A more recent case:
C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 12 December
2006, OJ C 331 of 30.12.2006, p. 5.
36See Hodges [13], 1.
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through public authorities, and its stressing of a need for a combination of mecha-
nisms, and for direct negotiation as the first option.37
Experience from the Danish Consumer Ombudsman, and the British telecommu-
nications regulator Ofcom and Financial Services Authority38 shows how quickly, ef-
ficiently and effectively a pillar 1 power can deliver both mass redress and behaviour
control impacts. Since it should be the primary duty of a regulator to see that mar-
kets remain balanced, that duty necessarily includes a duty to ensure that restitution is
made, since this is an essential requirement for achieving rectification of balance after
a mass infringement has occurred. Accordingly, redress, and rectification of the mar-
ket, should pre-cede the imposition of sanctions. This is contrary to the system under
which EU competition fines are imposed: in concentrating solely on the enforcement
policy based solely on deterrence, DG COMP has missed the essential objective.39 It
is anticipated that at least one major Member State will soon follow Denmark, and
diverge from the DG COMP approach to enforcement, by giving its national regula-
tor a pillar 1 collective damages power, and encourage the private sector to construct
and operate a viable ADR scheme for competition damages.
We need redress, but the collective action on its own is an old-fashioned tool for
delivering this. Litigation is always slow and expensive. There are more effective
ways of delivering redress and behaviour, which are cheap, fast and effective.
2 Consumer ADR
Debate about alternate dispute resolution (ADR) is far more recent than the debate
about collective redress, but it has spread quickly. ADR largely first arrived in Europe
in the 1990s from the United States (again) and also from use in disputes in Canada,
Australia and New Zealand between indigenous peoples and settlers’ descendants.40
The main reason for building an ADR system arises from concern that the courts are
too slow and expensive. But other features of ADR systems can influence decisions,
such as a desire for confidentiality, greater informality, and other outcomes such as
restoring peaceful relationships through a process that is not adversarial or bipolar
(one side wins, the other loses) but less aggressive and more consensual. Arbitration
of commercial disputes, nationally and internationally, is a familiar long-established
ADR technique.
The current over-riding economic imperatives of governments are highly relevant.
In order to rescue the economy, governments have to cut public expenditure and in-
centivise the growth of private business. They do not want to impose unnecessary
37OECD Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress (Paris: OECD, 2007) at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/38960101.pdf.
38s. 404 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The enforcement policy, based on ‘restorative jus-
tice’ principles (rather than a deterrence theory) prioritises disgorgement (restitution), discipline (penalties
for offenders) and deterrence, in that order. See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/
2010/036.shtml; FSA consultation paper [CP09/19] on enforcement of financial penalties at http://www.
fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_19.pdf.
39Hodges [7], 383.
40See Roberts, Palmer [26]; Menkel-Meadow [24].
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transactional costs (through unnecessary regulation or litigation) on business, but they
do want competitive and hence innovative markets, in which the rules are observed.
Increasing emphasis has been placed on extra-judicial dispute resolution, since this
may be particularly relevant for small claims by consumers and SMEs.
At EU level, measures started with two recommendations on standards for media-
tion, and have progressed to more formal structures:
• In 1998 the Commission published a communication on “out-of-court settlement
of consumer disputes.”41
• In April 2002 the Commission launched a Green Paper on ADR.
• A 1998 Recommendation on the principles applicable to out-of-court settlement of
litigation, including (a) minimum criteria guaranteeing the impartiality of the body,
the efficiency of the procedure and the publicising and transparency of proceedings
and (b) the principles of independence, transparency, adversarial, effectiveness,
legality, liberty and representation.42
• A 2001 Recommendation on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in con-
sensual resolution of consumer disputes, including the principles of impartiality,
transparency, effectiveness, fairness.43
• In 2001, an Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-Net) was launched44 and a consumer
claim form promulgated45 to facilitate consumers’ access to ADR providers.46
Subsequently renamed the European Consumer Centres, the ECC-Net consists
of national ‘clearing houses’ that assist consumers to settle possible cross-border
disputes with companies, by guiding them towards alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms.47 From 2006–2009, most complaints tackled by ECCs concerned
products and services, and contract terms. The main sector concerned by far over
those five years was air transport, and a large number of complaints also concerned
on-line transactions (55%).48 The total number of complaints handled by ECCs has
been between 50,000 and 60,000 annually.
• A separate network of national ADR bodies was established 2001 for financial
services, called FIN-NET (Financial Services Complaints Network).49 FIN-NET
links 50 out-of-court schemes that deal with complaints in the area of financial
41http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/commu/index_en.htm.
42Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for
Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes, [1998] OJ L 155/31, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:115:0031:0034:EN:PDF.
43Commission Recommendation 2001/310/EC on the Principles for Out-of-Court Bodies involved in
the Consensual Resolution of Consumer Disputes, [2001] OJ L 109, 56-61, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:109:0056:0061:EN:PDF.
44Council Resolution of 25 May 2000 on a Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-
judicial settlement of consumer disputes, OJ C 155/1, 6.6.2000.
45http://www.eejnet.org/filing_complaint.
46http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/publications/factsheet-ECC-Net_en.pdf (accessed 31 March 2011).
47http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32043_en.htm.
48See the ECC Network website consulted in 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/key_facts_figues_
en.htm
49See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/finnet/index_en.htm (accessed July 2008).
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services and covers the European Union, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. In
2009, FIN-NET handled 1,523 cross-border cases, of which 884 were in the bank-
ing sector, 244 in the insurance sector, 410 in the investment services sector, and 4
that could not be attributed to one sector.50
• In 2002 SOLVIT51 was created as a free-of-charge on-line problem solving net-
work in which EU Member States work together to solve without legal proceedings
problems caused by the misapplication of Internal Market law by public authori-
ties. There is a SOLVIT centre in every European Union Member State (as well
as in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). SOLVIT Centres can help with handling
complaints from both citizens and businesses. They are part of the national ad-
ministration and are committed to providing real solutions to problems within ten
weeks. From 2002 to 2010 SOLVIT resolved more than 1300 problems encoun-
tered by citizens and businesses due to incorrect application of EU rules by national
authorities. It accepts around 60 new cases per month, around 80% of which are
resolved, most of them within the deadline of ten weeks.
• A 2004 Voluntary European Code of Conduct for Mediators, covering:
– Competence, appointment, fees of mediators.
– Independence and impartiality.
– Ensuring the understanding by the parties, fairness, informed consent over any
agreement reached, parties’ freedom to withdraw.
– Confidentiality.52
• The European Small Claims Procedure, for cross-border claims under €2,000, in
force from January 2009, which does not require representation by a lawyer but
in which the loser must pay costs.53 This regulation eliminates the intermediate
step of requiring the recognition of the case and its enforcement in another state.
However, a 2007 study has shown that the cost, length or complexities of these
procedures are still too high to allow effective access to justice.54
• The Directive on mediation, in force from 21 May 2011, which promotes volun-
tary mediation as a viable alternative to litigation in providing access to justice,
and includes requirements on confidentiality of processes, and enforceability of
agreements.55 However, it applies to cross-border mediation only.
• In May 2010 a Recommendation introduced an EU-wide method for classifying
and reporting consumer complaints to be used by complaint bodies on a volun-
50This number is based on the reporting from 38 members of FIN-NET in 2009.
51http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/index_en.htm.
52Online: http://europa.eu.int/comm.justice_home/ejn/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.pdf.
53EC, Commission Regulation (EC) 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July
2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, [2007] O.J. L 199/1, see art 2 and Annex 1 art. 7.
The legal basis under art. 61 EC for coverage of domestic disputes as well as cross-border ones was a matter
of debate. Art 16 provides that the court shall not award costs to the extent that they were unnecessarily
incurred or are disproportionate to the claim. See Haibach [5], 293–601; Hondius [19], 131 et seq.; Baldwin
[2], 313–343; Whelan [31](ed.), 253 et seq.
54See Stuyck [28], below.
55EC, Commission Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008
on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, [2008] O.J. L 136/3.
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tary basis.56 This Recommendation is part of the gradual planned establishment of
an EU harmonized complaint classification system and a Union-wide database of
consumer complaints. The harmonised methodology is to be used on a voluntary
basis by complaints bodies.57
It was realised around the end of the 2000s that ADR can deliver effective redress for
consumers, and that ADR systems can deliver mass redress, which goes a long way
to solving consumer collective redress problems. There is wide political support for
extending consumer ADR, but there remains strong opposition to extending collective
actions, so the choice for political leaders is transparently clear.
Various national rules of civil procedure have been amended in the last decade to
extend the use of mediation for court-based claims. The influential pioneer was Eng-
land and Wales in the fundamental reform of the Civil Procedure Rules introduced in
1999.58 However, a key feature of the English reform was to combine court proce-
dure with mediation, and make settlement a formal goal of civil process. Those civil
law systems that implement the Mediation Directive but fail to integrate it with civil
procedure may struggle to realise benefits.
DG SANCO commissioned a series of studies on consumer ADR. A 2005 study
led by Professor Jules Stuyck published in 2007 mapped ADR in 28 Member States
plus USA, Canada and Australia.59 It found that a multitude of ADR methods are
used, that every Member State had put in place an unique mix. From this divergence,
it was far from self-evident how to come up with one ‘ideal’ ADR system. Gaps were
identified in sectoral and geographical coverage,60 leading to the conclusion that an
ADR scheme with general competence and guaranteed geographical coverage was a
necessary complement for sector specific mediation and arbitration schemes.
A 2009 study for the Commission found that there are far more ADR systems than
most people are aware of:61
• 750 national ADR business-to-consumer (B2C) schemes were identified across the
EU. The most were: Germany 247 (many decentralised schemes), Italy 129 and
UK 43, France 35. Civic say that ADR is clearly more relevant in Belgium, UK,
Spain, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Denmark and Malta than elsewhere.
UK seems to have the highest number of cases for any individual scheme, with the
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) often handling over 100,000 cases a year—
most large schemes handle 5,000 to 20,000 pa. There seemed to be 530,000 cases
in the EU in 2008, and this increased from 410,000 in 2006.
56See the recommendation at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/complaints_en.htm
57See the recommendation at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/complaints_en.htm.
58Pursuant to Lord Woolf [34].
59Stuyck et al. [28] available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports_studies/index_en.htm.
60Examples quoted at para 118 include no coverage for air transport disputes, car rental, sports centres and
computer stores in the Netherlands despite the existence of 30 sector specific arbitration schemes there.
Ombudsman in UK are said to be quite popular but are mainly present in the services sector and not goods.
61Civic Consulting, Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, 16 October
2009 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf 2 December 2009.
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• Schemes have a high degree of diversity, as between public and private origins,
and over the extent to which a decision or recommendation is binding on one
or both parties. Several types of collective ADR procedures are in use, notably
involving investigations, single representative procedures, and Scandinavian om-
budsmen. Concerns over the functioning of collective cases include (a) the com-
plexity of the procedure and related costs and (b) the non-binding nature of the
decision.
• ADR schemes are low-cost and quick for consumer disputes. The vast majority
are free or minimal cost to consumers (below €50) and are settled within a short
period of time (an average of 90 days62). ‘The analysis shows that many problems
connected with court proceedings can be solved by effective ADR schemes, such
as cost, duration of proceedings and formality.’
ADR is assuming increasing importance in EU law. In addition to the Media-
tion Directive mentioned above, measures that encourage Member States to establish
ADR schemes are:
• the E-commerce Directive63
• the Postal Services Directive64
• the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)65
EU legislative frameworks that require that adequate and effective ADR schemes
are put in place:
• the telecom sector66
• the energy sector67
• the Consumer Credit Directive68
• the Payment Services Directive.69
The Services Directive70 requires service providers to provide consumers with
information if they are members of an ADR scheme.
The number of ADR schemes that already exist is surprisingly large. Such
schemes operate primarily within individual sectors (such as financial services, hol-
idays, energy, telecoms) and have, therefore, arisen largely unnoticed except out-
side their particular sector. But the result is startling. Over 100,000 financial services
claims in the UK do not go to court annually but are processed by the Financial Om-
budsman Service. Around 11,000 claims are processed annually by the 50 sectoral
62Ibid, p. 33.
63Directive No 2000/31/EC; OJ, L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1.
64Directive No 2008/6/EC ; OJ L 52 27.02.2008, p. 3.
65Directive No 2004/39/EC; OJ L 145/1, 30.4.2004, p. 33.
66Directives No 2009/136/EC and No 2009/140/EC; OJ L337, 18.12.2009, pp. 11 & 37.
67Directives No 2009/72/EC and No 2009/73/EC; OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, pp. 55 & 94.
68Directive No 2008/48/EC; OJ L 133, 22.5.2008, p. 66.
69Directive No 2007/64 /EC; OJ L319/1, 5.12.2007, p. 32.
70Directive No 2006/123/EC; OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36.
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dispute Boards in the Netherlands. In Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, vir-
tually no medical negligence or product liability litigation has appeared in the courts
for many years, since the introduction of no fault compensation schemes.71 And so
on. This raises the issue of what the residual function may be for the courts.
In January 2011 the Commission issued a consultation on ADR and on possible
ways in which the use of ADR within the EU could be improved,72 noting that
ADR has, however, not yet achieved its full potential. In 2009, 6.6% of the
cross border complaints received by the European Consumer Centre network
were transferred to an ADR scheme.
3 The current state of consumer ADR
There is still widespread confusion about what consumer ADR actually is. Forthcom-
ing research from Oxford identifies that mechanisms involve consumer ombudsmen
or similar service providers (not mediation attached to the court process, and not
usually separate arbitration).73
The following issues need to be addressed:
1. To review the essential requirements that are contained in the 1998 and 2001 Rec-
ommendations, and update them. Are the principles of independence, impartiality,
transparency, fairness, hearing both sides, effectiveness, legality, liberty and rep-
resentation still the right ones?
2. To evaluate all ADR schemes against those criteria, and to facilitate or ensure that
all schemes observe the essential requirements and adopt best practice.
3. To address structural issues, notably: how to encourage business to join and fund
ADR schemes; how to extend the coverage of ADR schemes to more sectors; how
to provide effective cross-border solutions.
An example of issue 2 is: Can private sector dispute resolution schemes be in-
dependent and unbiased? Techniques have developed to achieve this. They rely first
on applying the essential requirements through combinations of vertical scrutiny by
regulators and customers, and horizontal scrutiny by competitors, the market and
the media. Leading examples are the criteria and systems established in the United
Kingdom for the telecommunications sector by Ofcom and general consumer sector
by the Office of Fair Trading,74 and established in the Netherlands by the Stichting
Geschillencommissie.
71Hodges [11], 143–175.
72Consultation paper on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a means to resolve disputes re-
lated to commercial transactions and practices in the European Union (European Commission, January
2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/docs/adr_consultation
_paper_18012011_en.pdf.
73Hodges, Benöhr, Creutzfeld-Banda [17].
74See Mapping UK consumer redress. A summary guide to dispute resolution systems (Office of Fair
Trading, May 2010), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/general_policy/OFT1267.pdf.
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A topical issue is whether ADR can be mandatory, or whether this infringes the
right of access to the courts under art 6 ECHR. An interesting case75 was decided by
the Court of Justice in relation to Italian implementation of the Universal Services
Directive (USD),76 requiring that Member States shall ensure that transparent, sim-
ple and inexpensive procedures are drawn up for dealing with users’ complaints, and
the general principle of effective judicial protection were compromised by the Ital-
ian law which made mandatory an initial out-of-court dispute resolution procedure
before a dispute was admissible in the ordinary court process. The Court ruled that
the USD does not set out the precise content or the specific nature of the out-of-court
procedures that have to be introduced at the national level. The only criteria were
those set out in article 34 of the USD: the principles of effectiveness, legality, liberty
and representation. The Court held that none of these principles limited the power
of the Member States to create mandatory out-of-court procedures for the settlement
of telecoms disputes between consumers and providers.77 The only requirements are
the maintenance of the right to bring an action before the courts for the settlement of
disputes and for ensuring that the Directive remains effective.
Almost all of the ADR systems use one or more of the same basic dispute resolu-
tion techniques of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Many systems are designed
to integrate several techniques within a tiered sequence, so as to enable different
forces to act together within a pyramid structure within which claims can be resolved
first in the quickest and cheapest fashion, whilst allowing progression to more ad-
judicatory (and hence more costly and slower) techniques involving adjudication by
arbitrator(s) or judge(s):
a. direct negotiation between the parties;
b. conciliation or mediation assistance from a trade association, ombudsman or in-
dependent party;
c. the option of referral to a binding decision by an independent third party through
arbitration (by an arbitrator, dispute resolution board, or ombudsman), as an alter-
native to starting a judicial procedure.
Those involved in stages (b) and (c) have sector-specific expertise, and the abil-
ity to adopt proportionate procedures, thereby delivering expert, swift and low cost
outcomes. Sectoral Boards, such as travel/holidays, financial services, telecommuni-
cations, motor vehicles, and so on, can be structured so as to satisfy requirements of
independence and absence of capture.
A significant percentage of initial consumer complaints (varying from sector to
sector) are requests for information about how to use products and services appropri-
ately or better, rather than disputes. If such inquiries are not dealt with well, they can
escalate into disputes. There is, therefore, a need for an early information service and
support function, and this is usually best provided by business entities.
75See J. Davies and E. Szyszczak, ‘ADR: Effective Protection of Consumer Rights?’ (2010) 35 E.L. Rev.
October 2010-11-19.
76Directive 2002/22 [2002] OJ L108/51.
77Alassini (C-317/08, C-317/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08) March 18, 2010 at [34].
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Another challenge for Europe is to enhance the existing national ADR systems
and create a powerful unified pan-EU mechanism. A good precedent exists in the
Netherlands, where a unified national system of sectoral complaint Boards exists.
What is needed is a single model that can be applied in every business sector. That
would increase consumer knowledge of the existence of trustworthy dispute resolu-
tion systems, increase throughput, and pressure business sectors to establish schemes
and pressure traders to join them. Cross-border claims can be handled by joining
up national ADR systems through building on the existing ECC-NET and FIN-NET
networks.
Importantly, the best ADR systems can also provide regulatory information and
effects, if designed properly. The dispute resolution procedures can deliver valuable
information on types of claims, trends and issues, and how well sectors and individual
businesses are performing, both in relation to substantive issues such as breach of
law, or commercial information on how to improve products and services, as well
as whether there is a need to improve the dispute handling process itself. This can
improve standards and provide a powerful mechanism for behaviour control. The
requirement is that the dispute resolution system should capture the data, and make it
transparent and available to the market, customers and regulators. Economies of scale
can also be achieved in combining dispute resolution systems within quality control
and regulatory systems. Hence, the dispute resolution system can operate also as a
Quality Management System, reinforcing and improving virtuous behaviour.
4 The 2011 Commission ADR and ODR proposals
On 29 November 2011 DG Sanco issued a Communication78 and two legislative
proposals, one a draft Directive on ADR79 and the other a draft Regulation on ODR.80
The Commission’s objective was ‘to improve the functioning of the retail internal
market and more particularly to enhance redress for consumers’. Both proposals are
based on Article 114 TFEU.
The following statements were made in the Communication:
• The vast majority of ADR procedures are free of charge for consumers or of mod-
erate costs (below €50). Most disputes submitted to ADR entities are decided
within 90 days.
• Most consumers who have used ADR recall it as a straightforward and transparent
process where support and advice was provided. Hence, consumers are more will-
ing to resolve disputes through ADR than through court proceedings. Businesses
also prefer resolving disputes through ADR, and those businesses which have al-
ready used ADR would use it again in the future.
78Communication from the Commission. Consumer solutions in the Single Market, COM(2011) 791/2.
79Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative dispute resolution
for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive
on consumer ADR), COM(2011) 793/2.
80Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution
for consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ODR), COM(2011) 794/2.
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• However, the diversity and uneven geographical and sectoral availability of
ADR entities prevent consumers and businesses from fully exploiting their po-
tential.
• In order to develop the full potential of the Single Market as the growth engine
for the European economy we need legislative action that ensures that every
consumer in the EU can bring a dispute, regardless of the sector in which it
has arisen, and regardless of whether it relates to a domestic or a cross-border
transaction, to an appropriate ADR entity.
The ADR Directive tackles the three main problem areas:
a. Gaps in the coverage of ADR entities at both sector-specific and geographical
level;
b. Lack of awareness and insufficient information preventing consumers and busi-
nesses from using ADR entities; and
c. Variable quality of ADR: a significant number of ADR entities are not in line with
the core principles laid down by the two Commission Recommendations.
The Communication gives examples of consumer problems that the proposals
would solve. It also says that it will introduce the following Flanking Measures:
1. Information campaigns to consumers, workshops for businesses, coordination
with national entities;
2. Training and requirements for ADR entities, using the ECC-Net network.
4.1 The ADR proposal
As evidence on which to base the proposal, the Commission asserts that a substan-
tial proportion of European consumers encounter problems when buying goods and
services in the internal market. In 2010, this was the case for approximately 20% of
European consumers.81 The losses incurred by European consumers because of prob-
lems with purchased goods or services are estimated at 0.4% of the EU GDP. The
analysis of the current situation identified the following main shortcomings which
hinder the effectiveness of ADR: gaps in the coverage, the lack of consumer and
business awareness as well as the uneven quality of ADR procedures.82
A detailed impact assessment (IA) has been made, analysing a range of policy op-
tions for both “ADR coverage, information and quality” and “ODR for cross-border
e-commerce transactions”. The IA concluded that only a combination of two instru-
ments on ADR and ODR can ensure access to impartial, transparent, effective and
fair means to resolve domestic and cross-border consumer disputes out-of-court.
In particular, a Framework Directive is the most appropriate way to ensure full
ADR coverage in all Member States, to inform consumers about ADR and to en-
sure that ADR entities respect specific quality principles. Full ADR coverage will
81Eurobarometer 342, “Consumer Empowerment”, p. 169.
82Cf. Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union of 16 October 2009,
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf, pp. 56–63; 112–115; 120–121.
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create the required framework on the basis of which an EU-wide ODR system can
effectively deal with disputes relating to cross-border e-commerce transactions.
The proposal applies to procedures for the out-of-court resolution of contractual
disputes arising from the sale of goods or provision of services by a trader established
in the Union to a consumer resident in the Union. Thus, it would cover accept both,
domestic and cross-border disputes. It does not apply to in-house dispute resolution
services operated by traders, to direct negotiation, or to judicial attempts at settlement.
The main elements of the proposal are:
1. Ensuring that ADR procedures exist for all consumer disputes.
2. Information on ADR and cooperation. Consumers must be able to quickly identify
which ADR entities are competent to deal with their dispute. Traders will have to
inform consumers on whether or not they commit to use ADR in relation to com-
plaints lodged against them by a consumer. This obligation will act as an incentive
for traders to use ADR more frequently. Member States may delegate responsibil-
ity for this task to their ECC-net offices. ADR entities will be encouraged to be-
come members of networks of ADR entities in sector-specific areas. The proposal
encourages cooperation between ADR entities and national authorities entrusted
with the enforcement of consumer protection legislation.
3. Quality of ADR entities. ADR entities must respect the quality principles of im-
partiality, transparency, effectiveness and fairness, which are laid down in the two
Commission Recommendations, and are given binding effect. The proposal re-
quires that disputes should be resolved within 90 days, and that ADR procedures
should remain accessible to all consumers by being free of charge or of moderate
costs for consumers.
4. Monitoring. In each Member State, a competent authority will be in charge of
monitoring the functioning of ADR entities established on its territory. The com-
petent autorities will publish regular reports on the development and functioning
of ADR entities.
The Directive would enter into force in national law 18 months after adoption.
4.2 The ODR regulation
Half the existing ADR schemes offer consumers the possibility of submitting their
complaint online, very few offer consumers the possibility of conducting the entire
procedure online (via online dispute resolution—ODR).83
The proposal is closely tied to the development of e-commerce. Objectives are
stated of
• Increasing the number of consumers who are willing to buy online from another
Member State by 20% in 2020
83The 2010 report of the European Consumer Centre’s Network indicates that more than half of complaints
(56.3%) received by the ECC-Net were linked to e-commerce transactions. However, out of the 35.000
cross border complaints received by ECC network in 2010, 91% could not be referred to an ADR scheme in
another Member State as no suitable ADR scheme existed (http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/2010_
annual_report_ecc_en.pdf).
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• Increase in the number of businesses that are willing to sell online in other Member
States by 10% in 2020.
The main elements of the proposal are:
1. Establishment of the European online dispute resolution system
The present proposal aims at establishing a European online dispute resolution
platform (“ODR platform”). This ODR platform takes the form of an interactive
website which offers a single point of entry to consumers and traders who seek to
resolve out-of-court a dispute which has arisen from a cross-border e-commerce
transaction. The platform can be accessed in all official languages of the EU and its
use is free of charge. ADR schemes established in the Member States which have
been notified to the Commission in accordance with the “Directive on consumer
ADR” will be registered electronically with the ODR platform.
Consumers and traders will be able to submit their complaints through an elec-
tronic complaint form which will be available on the platform’s website in all
official languages of the EU. The platform will check if a complaint can be pro-
cessed and seek the agreement of the parties to transmit it to the ADR scheme
which is competent to deal with the dispute. The competent ADR scheme will
seek the resolution of the dispute in accordance with its own rules of procedure
within 30 days from the date of receipt of the complaint. The ADR scheme will
have to notify to the platform some data in relation to the development of the dis-
pute (date when the complaint was notified to the parties; date when the dispute
was resolved; outcome of the dispute).
Under the proposal, a network of online dispute resolution facilitators (“ODR
facilitators’ network”) will be established which will consist of one contact point
for online dispute resolution in each Member State. The ODR facilitators’ network
will provide support to the resolution of disputes submitted via the ODR platform.
2. Information on the EU-wide ODR system
The present proposal requires traders established within the EU that engage in
cross-border e-commerce to inform consumers about the ODR platform. This in-
formation shall be made easily, directly, prominently and permanently accessible
on the traders’ websites as well as when the consumer submit a complaint to the
trader.
3. Monitoring
An annual activity report will be drawn up on the operation of the platform. The
compliance by ADR schemes with the obligations set out in this Regulation will
be monitored by the competent authorities to be established in the Member States
in accordance with the Directive on consumer ADR. Every three years the Com-
mission will report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of the Regulation.
4. Data Protection rules
The data entered in the ODR platform by the parties and the ADR schemes
will be stored in a database and will be subject to the relevant legislation on data
protection.
The financial appropriations for implementing this proposal from 2012 to 2020
are said to amount to EUR 4,586 million in current prices.
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4.3 Issues arising from the proposals
The Commission’s proposals are simple and bold. They establish a vision of capturing
issues between consumers and businesses, solving them and using the information to
improve practice and markets. If consumers can be taught to think ‘ADR’ whenever
they encounter a problem, the problem can be sorted out. Many problems will sim-
ply revolve around communication of further information, and not be ‘disputes’. But
disputes can also be resolved quickly and cheaply if consumers think ‘ADR’ instead
of ‘courts’ or ‘lawyers’.
The discussion above has focussed on influencing the behaviour of the private
sector. ADR is certainly spreading outside the consumer field. Many European States
have extremely effective Ombudsmen for disputes between citizens and the public
sector. Such Ombudsmen are effective because they operate directly under Parlia-
mentary authority and mandate, thereby enabling them to behave with great discre-
tion rather than in an authoritarian fashion, and they have built personal reputations
of the highest integrity. They do not just resolve individual disputes but (as seen with
the private sector TQS principle) can investigate systemic problems and behaviours.
The Ombudsmen in the Nordic States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have
had considerable effect on building a respectful style of relationships between the
state and citizens.
Commissioner Reding has also said that use of the proposed DCFR on contract
law will engage an ADR pathway for any disputes that arise,84 and DG JUSTICE
Commission is starting to look at B2B solutions for ADR. Many Member States use
ADR also for disputes between the public sector and its contractors and citizens.
However, funding is necessary to construct the necessary ADR infrastructures and
operate them. The proposals do not specify where such funding is to come from,
thereby keeping national options open. Some Member States pay for some (Nether-
lands) or all (Sweden) of their ADR systems. But in the current financial climate,
governments cannot be expected to find this money. That means that business must
be persuaded to fund ADR systems. The research that my colleagues and I have done
reveals that business sectors can switch from opposition to active support (and fund-
ing) of ADR systems where they see that significant benefits will accrue. Such ben-
efits are usually maintenance of high reputation in competitive markets, or blocking
threats of collective litigation.
There is a serious risk that the Commission’s ADR proposals will just not work
unless businesses across Europe are persuaded to fund them. It is important that a
campaign of information is now directed at business. There may be a price: an effec-
tive, comprehensive ADR system in exchange for an absence of collective actions.
ADR systems have huge potential to deliver not only effective, cheap and quick so-
lutions to B2C disputes, thereby solving access to justice issues, but also to provide
valuable market information that will enhance competition, innovation and safety.
ADR systems thereby challenge the traditional role of the courts. Some may be con-
cerned at this.85 But others will support the development of a new relationship and
84Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council on a Common European
Sales Law (European Commission, October 2011) COM(2011) 635, 11.10.2011.
85See the critical stance of PH Lindblom [23], 63–93.
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function between the courts and private sector ombudsmen. One model would be that
courts decide issues of law, and ombudsmen apply settled law to the facts of individ-
ual disputes. Hence, there should be a rational transfer of cases between courts and
ADR providers. In the 21st century, the civil justice system may change dramatically.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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